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IN THE SUPRE!'1E COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
INTERl'10UNTAIN SMELTING CORP.,: 
and STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Plaintiffs on Appeal, 
-vs-
INDUSTRIAL COM~ISSION OF UTAH, 
ANTHONY CAPITANO, and SPECIAL: 
FUND OF Section 35-l-69 Utah 
Code Ann., 
Defendants on Appeal. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16530 
Defendants on Appeal accept statement of Plaintiffs on 
Appeal in the Nature of the Case. 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COM11ISSION 
Defendant on Aopeal, Industrial Commission, issued its Order 
fur Compensation and Medical Expenses during temporary total 
~isability be paid by the employer. Permanent partial compensa-
tion was apportioned. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants on Appeal respectfully ask the decision of the 
I:cdustrial Co!11TI'ission be confirmed. 
FACTS 
This case is an excellent example of the need and benefit 
c': a "soecial" or "second injury" fund, if correctly used. 
There '-'·as a previous "ince:pacity" to employee by reason of 
~u~shct 1njur~ to his le~t foot while in the military. He has 
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~nd is receiving benefits of $113 per month from the United 
States Government which '.'.'ill continue during the remainder of t:, 
life based on a thirty percent "disability" rating for such inj~ 
The employee then sustained an industrial accident to his right 
foot which was rated by a medical panel as thirty percent loss 
of the right foot, or eight and one-half percent loss of the 
whole man. The panel then gave a rating of twenty-five percent 
loss of the whole man to which the administrative law judge 
concluded as eight and one-half percent for each foot injury pl~ 
eight percent loss because of the right foot injury "acting upo,_ 
the left foot injury to produce an additional loss over and abC"' 
the loss sustained by each foot injury taken seperately, or as 
stated by Larso:1's 1-lorkman's Compensation Law, Sec. 59.00: "The 
total effect of two successive injuries may be much greater t)-,a: 
the sum of schedule allowances for the parts." The Order in tL 
case by the Industrial Commission awarded the employee compensa· 
tion from the second injury fund for this "added upon" eight 
percent increase. See R-160 for excellent account by the admi,,_. 
strative law judae on the method of arriving at the cercenta~ 
of impairment by the medical panel. The only question at iss~ 
is the liability o'f' the Second Injur-y Fund for acportionment o' 
cor1pensation and medical exoenses durino temporarv total disa::. 
This case v,•as heard by the Industrial Commission after :~.e 
Ortega decision and befor-e the combined case of \·:hi te, etc \·:as 
issued. 
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Point I. 
TEMPORARY TOTAL COMPENSATION AND 
HEDICAL EXPENSES DURING TEMPORARY 
TOTAL ARE NOT APPORTIONABLE. 
The Industrial Commission is well aware of the Ortega and 
White decisions and the stated position of apportioning temporary 
total compensation and medical expenses during temporary total 
disability. The present case was heard before the White case 
ruling upheld Ortega without comment, even though the issue of 
apportionment of temporary total and medical expenses during 
temporary total disability was never at issue in Ortega. 
The present case is typical of the complete disruption of 
long standing logical and workable orders of the Industrial 
Comwission that have been put in confusion by the Ortega and 
Hhite decisions. There has been almost no judicial precedent on 
the subject of apportioning compensation and medical expenses 
during temporary total disability because the objections to such 
apportionment are so apparent. California has, however, under 
almost identical circumstances, clearly enunciated why temporary 
disability is not apportionable. 
In view of the ambiguity of the statute, 
the rule of liberal construction, the delays 
which will necessarily result if temporary 
disability is made apportionable, the result-
ing frustration of the legislative policy of 
making te~porary disability substitute for 
lost wages, and our public policy of expeditious 
oayment, we conclude that temporary disability 
is not apportionable. G~anado v. Workmen's 
Compensation Appeals Board, 4~5P.2 294 at 299. 
The rule of not apportionino temporary disability has always 
~rel·ailed in Utah until Orteaa. And that same rule applies 
-3-
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whether or not a prior disability increases compensation or TPec:. 
expenses during tenporary disability. 
The arguements against apportionment are especially meanbc-
ful under the present facts of this case. There is nothing in 
the record to indicate that either medical expenses or the ti~e 
of temporary total disability was increased by the prior foot 
injury that occured in military service. 
There is no possible reason under the law of workmen's co~­
pensation for a second injury fund to be liabile for the expense: 
incurred by an industrial accident when those expenses were 
not increased by a prior disability. Even sec. 35-1-69 makes t'.· 
employer liable "for the industrial injury onlv," and not for 
just a part of the expenses of that industrial injury. 
The commission detailed at considerable length in the l''hit: 
brief how the Orteaa decision drastically chanced the applicaL 
of the second injury fund. This case illustrates how far rea~­
inc; the judicial decision went in changing the law in this sta:· 
without a new legislative enactment. I ~ill give an illustrat~ 
of ~hat Ortega could do in just the case of approtionment of 
temporary total disability: 
Employee breaks a leg in an industrial accident and co~­
plications exist wl-:ich cause the me~ical panel to cive hirr a:: 
percent permanent partial disability for the leg injury a~te! 
months temporary total. He has a ten Percent prior disabiLt 
because of arthrit~s in h~s shoulder. 
hin fifteen percent permanent cart1al, 
-4-
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i~jury and ten percent pre-existing. Under Ortega the second 
injury fund would pay 66 2/3 percent of all expenses during tern-
orary total even though none of the expenses were for other than 
the industrial injury. 
The facts of both the illustration and of this case clearly 
demonstrate the unfairness of apportionment under Section 69 until 
a determination of permanent incapacity is made. 
Point II. 
THE SECOND INJURY FUND IS NOT LIABLE 
FOR A PRIOR INCAPACITY FOR WHICH THE 
EMPLOYEE HAS RECEIVED COMPENSATION. 
Double payment to an injured worker has not been approved 
by this court or any court to our knowledge in workmen's compen-
sation cases. Capitano is receiving $113 per month for the 
military injury from the U.S. Government. The general rule is 
well stated in Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law: 
It has always been accepted without question 
that the situation to which the Second Injury Fund 
applies consists of a prior noncompensable injury 
followed by and combining with a subsequent com-
pensable injury. Sec. 59.32 page 10-316. 
CONCLUSION 
The Order of the Industrial Commission should be affirmed. 
mhe general rule of not apportioning compensation or medical 
expenses durinc teroporary total disability is valid and followed 
~vall jurisdictions. 
It would be indefensable to apportion under the facts of 
-5-
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this case where all the medical expenses and compensation duri~ 
temporary disability were the result of the industrial accident. 
DATED this :/~day of February, 1980. 
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